Von Theokrits Leben wissen wir wenig. Geboren wohl zu Beginn des 3. Jh.s. v. Chr. im sizilischen Syrakus, hat ihn das landliche Lebensumfeld gepragt. Eine Reise nach Alexandreia, der Metropole des Ptolemaerreiches, fuhrte ihn vermutlich mit Kallimachos und Apollonios Rhodios sowie dem Lehrdichter Arat zusammen; belegt ist das freundschaftliche Verhaltnis zu dem in Milet praktizierenden Arzt und Epigrammdichter Nikias. Als Todesdatum kommen die 60er Jahre in Frage, aber auch ein erheblich spaterer Zeitpunkt. Die politischen und wirtschaftlichen Veranderungen seit dem 4. (...) Jh. - die Herrschaft der Makedonenkonige bedeutete das Ende der Autonomie fur die demokratisch organisierten kleinen griechischen Stadtstaaten - blieben nicht ohne Einfluss auf die Dichtkunst: Die Abkehr vom Gesellschaftlich-Offentlichen und die Hinwendung zum Elitar-Privaten; der Verzicht auf die grosse Form des Epos und der Tragodie, statt dessen die Bevorzugung kleinerer Formen. Vorausgesetzt ist gleichzeitig ein verandertes Rezeptionsverhalten: Die Werke der alexandrinischen Dichter richten sich nicht an eine grosse Zuhorerschaft im Theater, sie wollen vielmehr den gebildeten einzelnen Leser, der all die literarischen und mythologischen Anspielungen und Variationen bis hin zur Parodie verstehen kann, erreichen und erfreuen. Ebenso unverkennbar ist der Innovationswille bei den Themen der eidyllia Theokrits: die Hirtenwelt mit einer besonderen Akzentuierung des Erotischen, das stadtische Leben, die landliche Arbeitswelt der Bauern und Fischer... Die realitatsgesattigte Darstellung des Alltags der kleinen Leute steht allem Pathos des Heroischen, das Archaik und Klassik pragte, vollig fern. Daruber hinaus stellt die distanzierende Ironie mit ihren Hinweisen auf die Schwachen und Defizite der Protagonisten nicht nur einen deutlichen Gegensatz zur literarischen Tradition dar, sondern auch zu jenen Nachfolgern, die sich oft auf ein idealisierend-verengendes Theokrit-Bild berufen haben: Vergil und andere Bukoliker sowie die Verfasser von Schaferdichtung spaterer Zeit. Deren heile Idyllenwelt entspringt haufig der kitschig-verklarenden Sehnsucht moderner Stadtmenschen nach dem vermeintlich einfachen und naturlichen Landleben. Allein am Wort selbst ist die Bedeutungsverschiebung unverkennbar: Das realitatsnahe "kleine Bildchen" des Theokrit mit seinen oft derb-obszonen Spassen hat wenig gemein mit der romantisierenden Idylle franzosischer Rokokodichtung.". (shrink)

Propositional attitudes are often classified as non-phenomenal mental states. I argue that there is no good reason for doing so. The unwillingness to view propositional attitudes as being essentially phenomenal stems from a biased notion of phenomenality, from not paying sufficient attention to the idioms in which propositional attitudes are usually reported, from overlooking the considerable degree to which different intentional modes can be said to be phenomenologically continuous, and from not considering the possibility that propositional attitudes may be transparent, (...) just like sensations and emotions are commonly held to be: there may be no appropriate way of describing their phenomenal character apart from describing the properties and objects they represent. (shrink)

The sequencing of the human genome and decreasing costs of sequencing technology have led to the notion of ‘personalized medicine’. This has been taken by some authors to indicate that personalized medicine will provide individualized treatments solely based on one’s DNA sequence. We argue this is overly optimistic and misconstrues the notion of personalization. Such interpretations fail to account for economic, policy and structural constraints on the delivery of healthcare. Furthermore, notions of individualization based on genomic data potentially take us (...) down the road of genetic reductionism obscuring the role of environmental factors in disease and ill health. We propose that one should see personalized medicine as a way of using personal genomic information to stratify individuals into subpopulations and suggest that personalized medicine be seen within a broader idea of personalized healthcare, reflecting healthcare that integrates personal genomic data into cultural, environmental and personal contexts. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:19. HUME AND BARKER ON THE LOGIC OF DESIGN I find myself in complete agreement with what I take to be the main thesis of Stephen Barker's paper. It is certainly a mistake to concentrate our attention on the negative critique which Hume directed at the modes of argument of his rationalist predecessors and contemporaries and directed even more at the mode of certain conviction with which they presented (...) conclusions arrived at by arguments that did not have a logically compelling force. Hume was very much concerned with the problem of just what kind of force an argument that was not logically compelling could have; and he was even more concerned (perhaps) with the problem of how the logical structure of non-compelling argument could best be exhibited so that the logic of the argument would not be confused with its force. He made significant contributions to both of these problems; and I think he knew what he was doing well enough not to deserve the charge of inconsistency which Barker seems inclined to bring against him. There are some questions which he did not address, for the very good reason that they could only arise, or at least they could only be formulated clearly, as a result of the clarification of our ideas and our situation that Hume himself achieved. His distinction between "relations of ideas" and "matters of fact" may be overly simplistic. But in all its simplicity this distinction is powerful enough to enable Hume to deal quite shortly with any claim that it is inconsistent to want to achieve this goal of knowing and saying what is true, just because we have shown that we have no logical guarantee that we shall achieve it. Christian orthodoxy has always maintained that we are all of us equally "sinners"; but no orthodox Christian moralist has ever maintained the Stoic paradox that all sins are equal. It is precisely because we know that we cannot achieve Stoic wisdom that we cannot possibly be tempted to 20. accept that paradox. Hume's achievement was to show that (in spite of the serpent's false promise) our situation with respect to knowledge has always been just as parlous as our situation with respect to action. But even in these unhappy circumstances it is not inconsistent to strive for whatever measure of truth we can achieve; and to strive at the same time for absolute logical clarity about the limits of our insight and about the comparative merits of all proposed approaches to the goal. But I must not devote my time to an issue that Barker wisely asks us to keep an open mind about. I want to discuss the form and substance of the arguments with which Barker supports the thesis that I do agree with, rather than take up an aside of his that I happen not to agree with. So then, first, let us consider the fault that he finds in the "fifth way" of Thomas. He says that it "begs the question". It "obscures the nexus of controversy" because the first premiss of the syllogism makes a crucial assumption that needs to be proved. Now I deny that the "fifth way" obscures the nexus of controversy in that way. Thomas (and all of his competent hearers) knew perfectly well that his first premiss had not been universally accepted. He was stating the view of Aristotle about the generally purposive character of nature, and he knew that it had been doubted. But he did not think that a rational believer could hesitate about the choice between Aristotle's position and that of the atheist defenders of chance. Anyone who did hesitate was a fool, and arguments could not touch him. That some men were fools, and could "say in their heart, 'There is no God'", was part of the "problem of evil" which we must consign trustfully to the inscrutable wisdom of God (save in so far as Scripture reveals to us the origin of and reason for our fallen condition). In Hume's world, Aristotle's conception of the orderliness of Nature had been supplanted by Newton's. Newton accepted the atomist view that "natural bodies... (shrink)

This comment on the case presented in ‘Cholera and Nothing More’ argues that the physicians at this public-health centre did not have an ordinary clinician's obligations to promote the health of the people who came to them for care, as they were instead set up to serve a laudable and urgent public-health goal, namely, controlling a cholera outbreak. It argues that, nonetheless, these physicians did have some limited moral duties to care for other diseases they encountered—some ancillary-care duties—arising from their (...) voluntarily entering into a kind of intimate relationship with the patients they took in, one in which those patients effectively waive certain rights to bodily and medical privacy. (shrink)

In this paper H. S. Harris argues that it is misguided to suggest that Hegelrsquo;s philosophical project was a dialectical illusion generated by his historical situation and that he would never have believed that his vision was achievable if he had been faced with the world that we face today. Not only does Harris proclaim himself to be a Hegelian, he claims that Hegel would today also remain a Hegelian. He goes on to argue that despite the fragmentation of the (...) twentieth century and the apparent collapse of the vision articulated in the French Revolution, Hegelrsquo;s thinking continues to be relevant because although his philosophy is the lsquo;comprehension of onersquo;s timersquo;, Hegel also produces a philosophy that is out of time and somehow final.br /. (shrink)